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# Documenting language shift and loss: Bajuni in Somalia

Derek Nurse

## Abstract

This paper documents the drastic reduction to endangered status of the Bajuni dialect<sup>1</sup> of Swahili in southern Somalia. The data and analysis indicate that the decline started in the 1960s. The data consists of recordings of official immigration interviews with 152 refugees born between 1960 and 2000. Examination of a set of Bajuni phonological, morphological, and lexical features shows a progressive loss of the features, starting in the 1960s and gaining speed in the 1970s. Some of the oldest interviewees still spoke Bajuni, albeit not as their parents. Younger Bajunis no longer speak Bajuni but use Swahili with limited embedded Bajuni material. A few now only speak Swahili with no trace of Bajuni. The Bajuni community in Somalia has undergone a language shift from Bajuni to Swahili.

There are two purposes for this paper. The first is to document decline, so while it has not been possible to document in detail many cases of drastic language decline elsewhere, it can be done in this instance because the author had access to a long, continuous stream of interviews with refugee applicants. Second, it provides an objective account and overview of what emerged from the stream of interviews. This is necessary because many Bajuni refugees have been and still are subject to a legal procedure involving ill-informed analysts, lawyers, and decision makers who believe that the Somali Bajuni community still speaks Bajuni. They seem ill at ease with the notion of language shift, or with change in general. This paper will provide them with a better baseline.

## 1. Background: Somalia, ethnic Somalis, non-Somalis, Bajuni<sup>2</sup>

The current population of Somalia is some 11 million, of whom around 95% are ethnic Somalis. Ethnicity and clan affiliation is important in Somalia because in the absence of a functioning central government, they define the present and shape the future. Ethnic Somalis have occupied the approximate

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<sup>1</sup> (ki-)Bajuni is also known as (ki-)tik<sup>h</sup>uu, (ki-)Tikuu, and (ki-)Gunya.

<sup>2</sup> For further details see <http://www.faculty.mun.ca/dnurse/Database> [accessed 2018-01-10]

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area of Somalia for at least two millennia, and for much of that time were divided into what might loosely be called northern and southern Somali. In the first half of the second millennium AD, northern Somalis started to move south, eventually occupying most of the southern mainland, even pushing into northern Kenya in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Northern Somali forms the basis for today's Standard Somali, particularly the Mudug dialect of the northern Darod clan of the Somalis. Among the few non-ethnic Somalis are three small Bantu-speaking communities in the south, of whom the Bajuni are one. See map on pages 148-149.

The Bajuni are, or were, a cross-border community. A combination of factors suggests Bajuni communities have been in situ along the coast of Somalia and Kenya since at least AD1400, maybe longer.<sup>3</sup> They occupied a string of settlements from Kismayuu in southern Somalia down to the northern tip of Pate Island in northern Kenya, some 250kms. Most main settlements were on islands, a handful on the mainland. Basically fishers, they nevertheless depended on agricultural areas on the adjacent mainland to supplement their diet. When they were attacked by hostile adjacent groups (Somali or Orma), Bajuni working or living on the mainland withdrew to the islands. They were few while their mainland neighbours (recently Somali, formerly Oromo) were many, they were fairly defenceless while their mainland neighbours were armed and aggressive. The balance between them and the neighbours was fragile but stable. Bajuni stuck mostly to the islands, ethnic Somalis remained on the mainland. Relationships with ethnic Somalis were poor. With the exception of a few fishermen, businessmen, and political leaders, Bajuni did not and do not speak Somali.

Bajuni numbers have always been unclear but small. Portuguese accounts from the 17<sup>th</sup> and early 18<sup>th</sup> centuries talk of '1000 Bajuni fighters in 1678 and 4000 in 1727', at a period when Bajuni fortunes were at their peak (Strandes 1971). This declined in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The only official census of Somali Bajuni was made by the Italian administration in 1926, covering Chovai (434 people), Kismayuu (334), Chula (301), and Koyama (172), reported in Grottanelli (1955:25). Grottanelli, based on his own observations in 1953, put the population of Bur Kavo (mainland) at 80, and the whole Bajuni population in Somalia at perhaps 2,000 at that time. Most specialists (e.g. Cassanelli 1993) say the maximum population later in the 20<sup>th</sup> century was "a few thousand" (3000-4000?)<sup>4</sup>. Bajuni in northern Kenya are more numerous (15,000+) (Nurse & Hinnebusch 1993). The population in Somalia today is unlikely to exceed a few hundred, possibly less.

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<sup>3</sup> So in their home area they antedated the arrival of today's dominant northern Somali.

<sup>4</sup> A compound increase from 1926 of 1% over 40 years (1953-93) gives 2,990; an increase of 2% gives 4,450.

Bajuni is one of the northern dialects of Swahili. Until the events set out below, most Somali Bajuni were fluent and monolingual in their language, which remained fairly intact<sup>5</sup>. How different is Bajuni from other forms of Swahili? If Bajuni is compared with the neighbouring variety of Swahili (the Amu dialect) spoken on the northern Kenya coast, using a standard (Swadesh) 100-word list, 90% of the words are cognate. If Bajuni is compared with Standard Swahili, 86% of the words are cognate (Nurse & Hinnebusch 1993: 675-99).<sup>6</sup> Many of this 86% do not look or sound superficially the same, because of the numerous phonological (and morphological) differences between the two varieties. Although Bajuni and Standard Swahili certainly differ, the similarities are nevertheless greater than the differences. A rough assessment of the degree of mutual intelligibility would be to say that if two elderly Bajuni were using traditional Bajuni to talk about cultural matters such as fishing or family relationships, speakers of other forms of Swahili would have some trouble understanding them. Imagine someone from Mississippi going to the Gorbals in Scotland for the first time. In the opposite direction, adult male Somali Bajuni would have been quite familiar with Kenyan Swahili as a result of trading, and even adult females or children who had not left Somalia would have had some familiarity with Swahili.

The fragile balance between Bajuni and Somali people changed when Siad Barre, President of Somalia from 1969, was overthrown in 1991<sup>7</sup>. Somalia imploded, law and order collapsed, as did the lot of the Bajuni community. Ethnic Somalis, of the Isaaq, Darood, and Hawiye clans, started to invade the islands, bringing chaos, violence, and death with them. Events since 1991 only strengthened the age-old Bajuni aversion to the invaders and their language. Unable to defend themselves – they traditionally had no weapons and little access to or knowledge of guns – the Bajuni were terrified and in 1991/1992, helped by the UN and fishermen, thousands were carried south into Kenya, to stay with relatives in Malindi or Mombasa, or to refugee camps in SE Kenya, near Mombasa, the main one being (Kwa) Jomvu.

In principle, UNHCR camps were tightly sealed, a view represented by one language analyst who worked there briefly, once. All UNHCR refugee

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<sup>5</sup> It was also homogenous across the border. If the list is filled out for Kenyan and Somali Bajuni, the result is 100% identical – there are no differences between the two.

<sup>6</sup> These figures are based on comparing Standard Swahili with classical Bajuni. As Somali and Kenyan Bajuni are increasingly infiltrated by material from Standard Swahili, the contemporary level of lexical similarity is higher.

<sup>7</sup> Barre's government had a policy of only teaching standard Swahili in schools, however this did not affect the Bajuni as there were no secular schools on the Bajuni Islands. Bajuni children attended madrasa (religious schools) and were taught by a local Bajuni elder.

camps had strict written rules governing refugee exit from, and local Kenyan entrance to the camps. In practice camp boundaries were fairly porous. At Jomvu, for example, local outsiders came into the camp, speaking the local Swahili variety. Refugees interviewed by Brian Allen (see fn. 9) have referred to Kenyan teachers entering to teach English, literacy, and numeracy (at least). The Bravanese, in particular, quickly adapted to Kenya and Swahili and opened small businesses in and outside the camps. Small shops lined the main streets in the camps, filled with Kenyan goods. Kenyans and Somalis were always moving in and out. Many refugees had to sell portions of their rations outside the camps to get money for other essential items, such as clothes. I was also told that the number of refugees in camp often increased at the time of handouts of food and other essentials. Refugees in Kenya were allowed to live and work outside camps if they had the appropriate documents, and any doing so would use Kenyan Swahili as their main language of communication. In the first week of January 2011, I sent what has just been sketched above to the person who was the UNHCR Protection Officer for the Mombasa area camps from 1992 to 1995, and who in 2011 worked in a senior position for the UN in Europe, and received this reply:<sup>8</sup>

I believe your statements on the movements of these refugees outside the camps along the Kenyan coast, including Jomvu, and their interaction with the Swahili speaking Kenyan community are correct. In particular, although the movements of all refugees outside the camps was officially restricted and subject to authorization by the local authorities, in practice, all the sites were indeed ‘fairly porous’ in terms of opportunity by inhabitants to move and/or reside outside these locations. As much as camp residents were able to move into Mombasa for trading purposes (e.g. in the example mentioned by you, to sell portions of their rations outside of the camps to get money for other essential items), some effectively obtained work permits and were officially allowed to remain outside the camps, while others were registered in refugee camps, but effectively residing in Mombasa (and indeed collecting their rations at the refugee camp on distribution days). Finally, Kenyan nationals also entered the refugee sites without problems, either in an authorized manner, e.g. as members of UNHCR’s Implementing Partners, or in a more informal manner. e.g. to undertake casual work. All these factors will obviously have had an impact on the Swahili language skills development of Bajuni and other refugees formerly residing in the Kenyan coastal area.

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<sup>8</sup> The names of former UNHCR employees are confidential.

Thus, language was imported by outsiders and did not leave. I have heard refugees say they spoke Swahili in the SE Kenya camps and have read UK Home Office interviews where they said the same. In a 2010 Home Office interview one interviewee said:

When we were in the camp (Jomvu) and I was there when the other refugee kids in the camp used to play together and we used to communicate in the language...this (i.e. camp Swahili: DN) is what I was talking with them what I am talking with you and this is the language we used to speak when we went back home to Somalia...There is no difference between Kenyan and Somali Swahili.

As another young man in another Home Office interview in 2012 said, it was “cool to talk (camp) Swahili so we continued when we returned” (to Somalia).<sup>9</sup> There is much anecdotal evidence to affirm that young Somali Bajuni spoke their new version of Swahili after leaving the camps.

The Somali Bajuni who fled to the camps in Kenya in 1991/1992 took their children with them. Children born in the 1980s were aged between two and twelve in 1992, and camps were a Swahili-speaking environment where they spent their early years. The years in which languages are acquired easily and quickly begin at birth and continue into the early teens, so this generation, then children and in 2017 in their twenties or thirties, were in the camp(s) during the critical period, and there acquired the form of Swahili they now speak. They are now the young Somali Bajunis who form the bulk of today’s refugees and who no longer speak Bajuni well. Rather than saying that for them Bajuni changed into Swahili, it is more appropriate to say that a language shift/replacement occurred, in which Bajuni was replaced by Swahili, with or without some Bajuni colouring. Since they were the majority of their age cohort in the islands when they returned in 1998, they must have

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<sup>9</sup> These attitudes were confirmed when I communicated with a man (Brian Allen) who has over 1200 hours of experience interviewing many Somali Bajuni and is recognized as an expert witness by British courts. He confirms there was a large range of Bajuni language ability among those claiming to be Somali Bajuni during his time interviewing refugees. At one end of the scale there was more-or-less full fluency in Bajuni; such individuals tended to be elderly. At the other end of the scale are mainly younger individuals who speak only Swahili. In between are many individuals who speak a Bajuni-coloured Swahili, Swahili with some Bajuni, mainly vocabulary and common phonetic features, added. He also confirms that the prevalent attitude among young people is that they preferred Swahili, an international language with prestige and utility, whereas Bajuni has neither so they no longer find it useful.

influenced the minority who had stayed.<sup>10</sup> Over the past few years I have listened to dozens of young Somali Bajuni who were in the camps as children, or were children who stayed in Somali and must have come in contact with those who returned. Their speech can be characterised as Swahili with some degree of Bajuni colouring.

The Kenya government did not like the porous camps and ordered them closed, and in 1998 the UN closed Jomvu, telling the refugees it was safe to return to Somalia. While a few went to a new camp in NW Kenya, most decided to return to Somalia (a mistake, as it turned out, as the danger had not gone away), carrying Swahili and attitudes to Swahili with them. During the 1990s UN workers also entered southern Somalia, most from the south, many speaking Swahili. The combined result was a Swahili presence, in areas such as the islands, where once only a few older males had spoken Swahili. Linguistically, any viable homogenous Bajuni language community crumbled in these circumstances. There were few older people to offer a language model, no stable set of circumstances for language transmission, families had been broken up, people were too busy just surviving to be concerned about their children learning the language properly, and for young Bajuni in Somalia there was little incentive to speak Bajuni.

The language situation on the islands has now changed. The Bajuni spoken by young Somali Bajuni from the islands was not that of their grandparents or even parents: they speak poor Bajuni and lots of Swahili. The decline can easily be seen by comparing the speech of younger Somali Bajuni now with that of older Bajunis in 1980 or earlier (born as early as 1930). Grottanelli (1953) has data on Bajuni as spoken by adults at that time (so born as far back as 1900). The materials on Bajuni in Nurse (1994) are transcriptions of elderly Bajuni, born between 1910 and 1930, interviewed and recorded by Nurse around 1980. The Bajuni here and the grammatical sketch in Nurse (1982) is clearly not the language spoken by younger Somali Bajuni today. Bajuni in Somalia is rapidly becoming an old peoples' language. Young Bajuni from Somalia today speak the kind of Swahili widely spoken in East Africa, especially along the adjacent coast of Kenya.

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<sup>10</sup> It is difficult to determine the population figures accurately. Local elders estimated that before the civil war the total number of Bajuni was some 11,000, though they were not exactly sure; Cassanelli (1993) estimated the number at "perhaps 3,000 to 4,000".

It should be clarified that we have no direct objective knowledge of older, recent, or current language use in the Bajuni areas of Somalia. No professional linguist has been on the ground to observe the situation. This is true for the decades before the exodus in 1991/1992<sup>11</sup>, for the six-year camp period, and for the years since the return to Somalia. Because southern Somalia was a war zone from 1991 onwards, no outside observer or professional linguist was there. Likewise, no professional linguist spent any time in the Jomvu refugee camp during the period when most of the Somali Bajuni population lived there (1991/1992 to 1997/1998)<sup>12</sup>. Finally, we also know almost nothing about the language situation when the Bajuni returned to Somalia. So the foregoing is based on many secondary reports from those who have interviewed expatriate Bajuni and asked them about the language situation, and observed their language abilities. I personally have listened to 177 people described as Bajuni. They ranged from a few older individuals who spoke Bajuni reasonably well to - in recent years - young people who no longer speak traditional Bajuni or indeed any Bajuni.

## **2. Measuring Bajuni language ability in these circumstances**

In the early 2000s,<sup>13</sup> Bajuni refugees started to arrive in Europe and North America. Most refugees covered here went to the Netherlands or the UK, where they were interviewed by officials. These officials asked few or no questions about language use during the period from, say, 1980 to the refugees' arrival in Europe. Of the UK cases, some but not all were also independently interviewed in Europe by a European specialist (see fn. 9). Each of his interviews lasted three hours and some discussed language use in Somalia and the camp. Nearly all the direct claims about language use derive from what individual interviewees said on these occasions. This is supplemented by observing the linguistic differences between earlier Bajuni speech (Grottanelli 1955, Nurse 1982<sup>14</sup>) and that in the interviews discussed in the next sections. Ideally, it would have been desirable to interview all 155

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<sup>11</sup> A German Swahili scholar (Prof. W.J.G Moehlig) who spent time in southern Somalia in the 1980s gathered some linguistic material and shared it with me. It is similar to that in Nurse 1982 (Kenya) and Grottanelli 1953 (Somalia). It is Bajuni and not the language now spoken by young people. He did not examine language variation.

<sup>12</sup> A Sprakab employee spent a brief period there in the 1990s but published no report of what he observed.

<sup>13</sup> I first listened to Bajuni refugees in 2004, but some arrived before that.

<sup>14</sup> Other sources for traditional Bajuni are the texts in Bajuni.com, Mahazi 2008 and Nurse 1994.



– and others – at different points in their linguistic development, but as that was impossible I had to fall back on the contents of the official language interviews.

## **2.1. The official language interviews**

The language interviews were part of the official process to establish the country of origin of the refugee applicants. My use of them now for this kind of language analysis was not part of the original purpose. A total of 131 of the 155<sup>15</sup> cases used by me followed the same pattern. Refugee claimants were officially interviewed in Europe, the interviews were recorded, a copy given to analysts appointed by the government concerned, with a copy to me. I had access to their analyses.<sup>16</sup> Two main agencies administered these official interviews: one a private language company (Sprakab) in Sweden, the other an arm of the Dutch government (IND). Sprakab interviews involved an interviewer and a refugee; IND interviews had an interviewer, interpreter (twice, once in both directions), and refugee. Although the interviews varied in length from 16 minutes (Sprakab) to 64 minutes (IND), the refugee's actual language component varied from 6 to 15 minutes. The interviews covered language and local knowledge. The technique most used in these official interviews was question-and-answer, so the quantity of syntactic material is limited.

All refugees to the UK were further interviewed by the Home Office, not primarily about language but about their life, conditions and events in Somalia, and their flight to Europe. A few refugees to the Netherlands had a supplementary interview carried out by De Taalstudio, an independent linguistic company intermediary between professional linguists and lawyers,

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<sup>15</sup> To date I have dealt with 182 cases from Somalia, of which 177 are Bajuni. Some of these are excluded here, because the data was poor or I was not sure the interviewees were really Bajuni, resulting in the 155 used as the database. It has been pointed to me that perhaps the results might not be typical of all Bajuni refugees from Somalia; that is possible, but they form a consistent and clear pattern, which can be seen in Tables 1 and 2, and the discussion following Table 2. It has also been pointed out to me that, since I do not know in many cases whether or not the legal process admitted the refugees on the grounds it had not been proved they were really Somali Bajuni, some or all of the 155 might not be Bajuni. In most cases, the legal decision was based on doubts expressed by IND or Sprakab. I see no reason to value the doubts of these bureaus. Their reports reveal nothing about their personnel, their Bajuni expertise, their sources, or their publications. According to the information available to me, these analysts do not have the qualifications required to judge the authenticity of a Bajuni speech sample.

<sup>16</sup> IND had access to my analyses, but Sprakab apparently did not.

or by the applicant's solicitor. The information gleaned from these supplementary interviews partly overlapped with that from IND, and partly exceeded it.

The remaining 24 cases varied in format. In most, I provided a questionnaire, administered in Europe by a Bajuni or Swahili speaker, in the presence of a lawyer. This focused on language knowledge (eliciting vocabulary, phonology, some morphology) and on specific areas of local knowledge, which I knew from experience that most Bajuni would likely be familiar with. One result of all this is some range in the quality and quantity of the data forming the basis for the judgements below about language ability.

## 2.2. How to assess decline in language ability

In principle, the forensic linguistic analyses mentioned in section 2.1 should have four components: syntax, morphology, phonology, lexis. In practice, there was very little or no meaningful syntax, partly because basic syntactic patterns do not vary significantly between Bajuni and Standard Swahili, partly because the question-and-answer format of the interviews resulted in short sentences, with little diagnostic syntax. So the evidence for language decline comes from lexical, phonological, and morphological features. These features are embedded in a matrix which might be described as neutral or as Swahili/Bajuni. Using this kind of data<sup>17</sup> to assess language loss is not perfect but I judged it to be adequate.

There are some 35 phonological differences between Bajuni and Standard Swahili, summarized in a list at the end of the Wordlist in the main source and discussed in more detail at various places in the literature mentioned. Of the 35 differences, some occur infrequently while others are common, for instance:

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<sup>17</sup> <http://www.faculty.mun.ca/dnurse/Database/> [accessed 2018-01-10] is the main source for lexicon, phonology, and vocabulary and includes reference to its own, secondary sources. One lexical source (Sacleux) was so long (1100 pages) that I worked my way steadily forward but did not reach the end so there might be some additional lexical material. Phonological differences can be seen by scrolling down to the list at the end of the Wordlist. Differences with Standard Swahili morphology are not listed in the sources and have to be worked out by comparing them with Standard Swahili. The morphological items can be deduced by comparing the relevant parts of the Grammatical Sketch on the same website with those of Standard Swahili.

Feature	Swahili	Bajuni
Affrication t > [tʃ]	tatu 'three'	tʃatʃu
Dentalization z > [ð]	zamani 'long ago'	ðamani
Lenition of older v > w or zero (depending on following vowel)	wazee 'parents' -ona 'see'	vaðee vona
Gliding of [dʒ] > [j]	modʒa 'one'	moya

Morphological differences number just over a dozen, some nominal and some verbal. The single commonest verb-morphological feature occurs in the expression of non-past/non-future events, seen in:

Swahili	Bajuni
ng'ombe hu-la nyasi 'cows eat grass' Habitual/generic	ng'ombe hu-la nyasi 'cows eat grass'
ng'ombe wa-na-kula nyasi 'cows are eating grass' Ongoing	ng'ombe hu-la nyasi 'cows are eating grass'
tw-a-mpenda 'we like him (now)' State	chw-a-mpenda 'we like him'

This difference is partly morphological and partly cognitive. Where Swahili has a three-way contrast, Bajuni has only a binary contrast with 'state' (with *-a-*) versus the rest (*hu-*). Since forms expressing states are relatively few, the predominant form is that involving *hu-*. Among those of the 155 refugees who have this contrast, very few have only the binary contrast, most simply having more *hu-* than Swahili, while also having some Swahili *na*. For details, see Nurse 1982.

A second, purely morphological difference is where Bajuni retains the older *ie*-suffix to express the perfect, where Swahili has innovated prefixal *me*: Bajuni *u-f-ie* 'he has died' versus Swahili *a-me-kufa*.

### 2.3. The morphological, phonological, and lexical data.

In this section we explore differences between the interviewees in terms of location, age and gender and score them in terms of average number of Bajuni features. As much raw information from the interviews as possible is included in Appendix 1 below. There are eight locations, from north to south: Kismayu, Fumayu, Koyama, Chovai, Chula, Mdoa, Chand'aa, and Ras Kiamboni. The larger settlements are Kismayu, Koyama, Chula, Ras Kiamboni. Kismayu and Ras Kiamboni are on the mainland, the rest are islands. Mdoa is an islet off the southern tip of Chula, so it is treated as one with Chula. Cases are presented in the chronological order of handling in the countries concerned.

Table 1: Analyses

	Morphology	Phonology	Lexicon
Overall average (155 cases)	0.64	6.00	14.28
<b>Place of origin</b>			
Kismayu (19 cases) average	0.68	6.00	11.19
Fumayu (5 cases) average	0.80	6.60	14.8
Koyama (45.5 cases <sup>18</sup> ) average	0.37	3.97	12.67
Chovai (10 cases) average	0.30	9.30	15.5
Chula/Mdoa (57 cases) average	0.65	6.46	16.23
Ras Kiamboni (17.5 cases) average	2.00	11.00	18.00
<b>Year of birth</b>			
Born 1962-69 (11 cases)	2.10	11.64	18.60
Born 1970-79 (25 cases)	0.80	5.84	13.40
Born 1980-89 (69 cases)	0.65	5.65	15.12
Born 90-2000 (34 cases) <sup>19</sup>	0.15	3.58	11.23
<b>Residence in refugee camp</b>			
Average for camp residents (45 cases) <sup>20</sup>	0.64	4.89	13.00
<b>Gender</b>			
Male (82 cases) average	0.89	6.58	15.6
Female (73 cases) average	0.55	5.37	13.00
<b>Interviewer</b>			
IND (39 cases) average	1.10	7.54	14.29
Sprakab (89 cases) average	0.50	4.82	13.93

### Year of interview

Although I did a year-by-year breakdown of the interviews from 2004 to 2016, they are not included in the table. The year in which an individual applied for asylum is largely arbitrary and not linked to their linguistic knowledge. Consider, for example, 2014, with a 30-year span of birth ages from 1970 to 2000. All the information contained in a year-by-year analysis of interview years emerges more clearly in the paragraphs following

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<sup>18</sup> There are some cases of 0.5, because some individuals lived in two locations.

<sup>19</sup> Those in this section do not total 155 because some birthdates are not known.

<sup>20</sup> There may be more former refugee camp residents than noted.

### **Place of origin**

There is useful and even surprising information in rows 2-7. All the morphological, phonological, and lexical figures for Ras Kiamboni are higher than the overall average, which suggests strongly that it had (has?) a population reasonably familiar with Bajuni, more so than the other settlements. This is surprising because Ras Kiamboni is just across the border from Swahili-speaking Kenya. Earlier I had heard individuals say that the language spoken in RK is more heavily influenced by Swahili than other settlements and in the past I repeated this because it seemed plausible.

Figures for all three features are below average for Koyama. Figures for the other island settlements and Kismayu are scattered around the overall average. They have fewer Bajuni and therefore more Swahili features. This is also surprising, because it has been assumed in the past that they were more conservative because of their apparent isolation.

Having said that, there is some local variation that cannot be explained from the data. Consider the case UK8, 1985, from Chula Island, showing no Bajuni features at all, with other Chula cases from that or adjacent years, with plenty of Bajuni features. This may (?) be the result from different families having different attitudes to language use, or it may have to do with differences within the settlements: Koyama and Chovai have more than one village, Chula has several villages/quarters, Kismayu and Ras Kiamboni have or had different quarters/areas, which may (?) have behaved different linguistically.

### **Year of birth**

This does play a role in Bajuni ability: most individuals born in the 1960s have clearly higher levels of Bajuni features, specially morphological and phonological, than those born later. We could say they have Bajuni as their matrix in which they embed Swahili material whereas the converse is true from the 1970s onward. I had hitherto assumed that real decline started only with the camp experience. One interviewee also offered a similar opinion, saying that those who left Koyama 'before 2000' spoke Bajuni but that those who left more recently do not. The data here does not support this. Bajuni was in clear decline as far back as the early 1970s in most of Somalia (except perhaps in Ras Kiamboni). The lowest incidence of Bajuni features is in the youngest speakers (1990 onward). It cannot be demonstrated that the decline is the direct result of the refugee period; it is possible that the camp period reinforced a linguistic decline that was already well under way.

### **Residence in a refugee camp**

I was surprised by the results here. Row 12 shows morphological and phonological scores slightly below the overall average (row 1). Comparison of individuals from various locations who were in Jomvu with those not in Jomvu also indicates little difference. This suggests that residence in a refugee

camp might have inhibited use of Bajuni and influenced attitudes but did not have a significant effect on learned ability in Bajuni.

### **Gender**

Morphological and phonological scores for men are slightly above the group average, whereas those for women are slightly lower. Lexical scores are more similar. It is difficult to know what significance to attach to these figures.

### **Interviewer**

This plays some role. The two main interviewing agencies were Sprakab (89 interviews) and IND (39 interviews): see column 2 in Table 1. As can be seen there, IND, in a few cases supplemented by a Taalstudio interview, elicited more morphological and phonological material than Sprakab and the overall average. With lexical material, the results were more similar and closer to the overall average. Even with lexical material, there is variation induced by the interview, because not all interviews ask the same questions.

Another variable not easy to deal with is the performance of individual interviewees, which varies considerably. Some individuals liked to talk and/or felt comfortable, while others did not.

Perusal of rows 8-11 shows morphological features undergoing a drastic decline, starting with the 1970s and continuing up to speakers born from about 1990 onwards, whose speech has essentially no Bajuni morphology. In the recordings, 104 of the 155 speakers had no discernible Bajuni morphology.

Speakers born in the 1970s start to have significantly fewer phonological features than those from the 1960s, but the decline flattens out after 1970 or so. The features retained are often the same across speakers, suggesting that speakers are aware of, and can reproduce, the phonological features said to be characteristic of Bajuni, sometimes with hypercorrection. Note that 25 of the 155 speakers had no discernible Bajuni phonological features.

There is relatively little decline in the ability to produce Bajuni vocabulary. This may be because interviewers constantly focus on certain cultural-semantic areas, with which most interviewees are fairly familiar (food, dance, ceremonies, kinship terms, cultural events, currency, some numerals, and some salient common conversational items: pronouns, ‘small, few, large, plane’). Vocabulary from these areas shows up constantly and almost predictably. Note that 6 of 155 had no discernible Bajuni vocabulary.

So Bajuni morphology is lost before the other features assessed. We see that 21 of 155 had no phonological features but retained lexical traces, so Bajuni phonological features are lost before lexicon. Only 3 of 155 showed no Bajuni vocabulary but still had (minimal) phonological traces. A total of 3 of 155 had no traces of Bajuni morphology, phonology, or lexicon (so could only be identified as Bajuni on the basis of their local, nonlinguistic knowledge on the interview).

### 3. Conclusions

Table 1 and the Appendix show competence in Bajuni in Somalia dropping since the 1960s, but steadily and most drastically since the 1970s, so it is not associated with the 1991 exodus to the refugee camp(s).

Decline in Bajuni language competence is not the same as decline in the size of the Bajuni community in Somalia. While it is true that recent political events in Somalia (see section 1, paragraph 5) drastically reduced overall Bajuni numbers from a few thousand to a few hundred or fewer between the late 1980s and 2017, the overall Bajuni population in Somalia has fallen since the ‘several thousand Bajuni troops’ (i.e active young males, implying a much larger general population), mentioned by Strandes for the 17<sup>th</sup> and early 18<sup>th</sup> centuries. Bajuni versions of their origins emphasize the role of Somalia. The Bajuni seem to have been leaking south into Kenya during the past two or three centuries.

There is no reason to think Somali Bajuni linguistic competence was really seriously impaired before the 1970s. Grottanelli, working in the 1950s, mainly in Kismayu, does not mention a Swahili incursion. The subsequent drop in Bajuni competence and its replacement by Swahili occurs in all settlements but there is regional variation, with, surprisingly, most retention in Ras Kiamboni and most loss on Koyama Island.

Bajuni morphology is replaced first, followed by phonology, and lastly vocabulary. While a small minority has no discernible Bajuni features, even today most speakers can produce some Bajuni words in their Swahili, if pushed. That said, there was at least until recently quite a range of Bajuni ability<sup>21</sup>. In Appendix 1, compare the levels of knowledge for NE20 and NE21 with those for NE3 or UK8: NE21 has 6 morphological and 11 phonological features, and 40 lexical items: NE20, who spent time in Jomvu, is similar. At the other end of the scale, UK8 has no discernible Bajuni features, and NE3, born as early as 1965, is similarly low. The range can be seen in Table 2:

*Table 2: Range of incidence of morphological, phonological, and lexical features*

	Morphological	Phonological	Lexical
Highest	6	27	45
Overall average	0.64	6.00	14.28
Lowest	none	none	none

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<sup>21</sup> Confirmed by Brian Allen.

Little or no variation can be attributed to the interview year (2004 versus 2016), to males versus females, or to residence in a refugee camp. The latter may seem surprising – while attitudes toward the relative value or usefulness of Bajuni and Swahili were influenced by residence in a camp, leading to a general and long term devaluing of the use of Bajuni, it is not possible to prove that this directly reduced Bajuni competence in those who already had it (e.g NE20).

Finally, the data above was possibly influenced by variables hard to control or measure: the interview and the interviewer, the attitude of the interviewer, the state of mind of the interviewee,<sup>22</sup> whether the interviewee was used to giving objective descriptions, the role of family attitudes towards retention of Bajuni, the position of Bajuni in individual villages.

### **3.1. How did language change occur: within villages, families, or individuals?**

This study shows that language decline has occurred and is still continuing, but it cannot answer two questions: (1) how does change take place on the individual and local level?, and (2) what were the causes of this decline? The kind of analysis undertaken here permits no insight into how language change took place within communities, villages, families, or individuals. I listened to individuals speak about ‘how we all talked Bajuni (or Swahili) at home’ or ‘how the parents talked Bajuni to each other but we (children) talked Swahili’, but this is anecdotal. In any case, not all interviews dealt with such matters, so the anecdotes are incomplete. I doubt we will be able to answer this question because it would require being in a position to observe, and that time is gone.

### **3.2. What kind of Swahili do all these individuals speak?**

I thought until recently that the fading of Bajuni linguistic competence and its replacement by Swahili were the direct or indirect result of the recent Kenya refugee camp experience, so it was easy to assert with some confidence that what Somali Bajuni were speaking was mostly Swahili from the camps. But as the analysis above shows, the camp experience has not had much direct effect on linguistic competence in Bajuni. The influence of Swahili is evident in the early 1970s, or even earlier, and has continued apace.

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<sup>22</sup> Some were diagnosed as having trauma: we do not know the effect of trauma on language retrieval.



We have no direct evidence of where this influence came from, but the best candidate is coastal Kenya, based on circumstantial evidence. From what is known of East African coastal history, Swahili seems to have been present as a minority language along the mainland coast, particularly in Kismayuu, since at least the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Six Swahili-speaking communities can be discerned. In approximate order of appearance, they are as:

1. Bajuni traders and fishermen sailed down the Kenya coast, to Lamu, Malindi, and Mombasa, and still do. We do not know how long they had been doing this but most likely for several centuries;
2. the Sultan of Zanzibar controlled a ten-mile wide coastal strip from south of Zanzibar to Mombasa and Lamu in Kenya, and then up to Kismayuu and Muqdisho. It is not clear when this started but most likely before the 19<sup>th</sup> century. His administrators and traders would have presumably spoken Swahili there, and did into the 20<sup>th</sup> century;
3. people living in Ras Kiamboni easily crossed the border into northern Kenya, and vice versa. This is hard to date but has presumably also been happening for centuries. It is only in recent decades that the border has been hard to cross;
4. in the 1850s, a group of slaves intended for the Middle East jumped ship at Kismayu and fled into the interior. They were the ancestors of today's numerous Mushunguli living along the Juba, starting near Kismayuu and up the Juba. While most speak a form of Zigua from NE Tanzania,<sup>23</sup> they also speak Swahili and have managed to maintain contact with their kinfolk back in coastal Tanzania, despite a separation of a century and a half;<sup>24</sup>
5. Kenyan colonial officers working for the British colonial government are known to have operated across southern Somalia in the first part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century;

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<sup>23</sup> The presence of this Zigua community along the Juba and into Kismayu might provide the answer to one mystery. The speech especially of younger Somali Bajuni has a very few phonetic features not explicable from Bajuni or Swahili. One exception is the neutralization of the distinction between /l/ and /r/. In the refugee camps were speakers of Bajuni, Swahili, and Somali, all of which maintain the /l-r/ distinction. The only language under consideration here without that distinction is Mushunguli. Could influence from Mushunguli have played a role in this loss of the /l-r/ distinction?

<sup>24</sup> Dundas (1893: 214) reports Swahili being 'spoken throughout the whole Gusha' (= Goshu = Mushunguli) district in 1891.

6. various people in southern Somali today use varieties of Swahili: aid workers, UN personnel, the crews manning the ships that bring aid and goods into Kismayu, mostly from Mombasa in SE Kenya. Their crews speak Swahili, mainly Kenyan coastal Swahili.

What kind of Swahili did all these people speak? We may never know exactly but consideration of the various pieces just presented – Bajuni men sailing south along the coast to Kenya, cross border contact with northern Kenya for those at Ras Kiamboni, officials and traders based in Zanzibar and Mombasa up to Kismayuu, Kenyan colonial officers in southern Somalia, and recently, crew aboard aid ships from Kenya – point at a form of coastal Swahili, particularly Kenya coastal Swahili. Kismayu is pivotal in several of these influences. Among the 155 test cases are 19 from Kismayu: 19 is not a large sample but there is a considerable range in Bajuni competence among them.<sup>25</sup> which is consonant with the view that Kismayu was a mixed area linguistically, with Bajuni and Swahili speakers present.

All this, while giving the background, does not provide a concrete answer to the question of what happened in particular in the 1960s and especially the 1970s to cause the decline of Bajuni and the rise of Swahili. The first five groups mentioned above were too early to have caused the change in the 1960s/1970s, and the sixth is too late. None of these, nor any combination of these, seems to be the stimulus. An explanation of a different kind was suggested to me in 2017 by Lameen Souag (p.c.). Bajuni in Somalia began its decline in or around 1960, which was also exactly the year of Somalia's political independence from European powers. Is this a coincidence? The Somali Bajuni community had long been alienated from the larger ethnic Somali community but now they had to make a decision, faced with the reality of a majority Somali government. Perhaps they had the feeling that their identity and maybe their future was to the south, with their linguistic siblings south of the border, in Kenya, and their shift to Swahili was an expression of this feeling? I find this persuasive but it cannot be proved or quantified.

#### **4. Comments on the role of language interviews and analyses in refugee cases**

My original text for this paper restricted itself to the Bajuni and their language but a reviewer, supported by the editor, urged me to comment on the role of language interviews and analyses in refugee cases.

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<sup>25</sup> Compare NE6 with UK63, born just two years apart.

I should make clear what I know and what I do not. I have prepared linguistic reports on individuals claiming to be Somali Bajuni and applying for refugee status in nine countries. In six countries (Belgium, Canada, Germany, Ireland, Norway, Sweden) I only or mainly prepared a few linguistic reports, and cannot comment on the refugee system in those countries. For Switzerland I prepared a few reports but was invited to Bern, where the cases are mainly dealt with, which resulted in considerable discussion of some parts of the process there. For the Netherlands, I prepared many dozens of reports: listened to official (IND) interviews and in some cases to secondary interviews carried out by de Taalstudio, a private language company; I was invited to Amsterdam for discussions, had various email discussions about some parts of the process in that country, and was occasionally sent indignant messages from IND officials and asked to comment. For the UK, I prepared many dozens of reports: I listened to official (Sprakab) interviews, read Home Office interviews, saw some reports by Brian Allen based on three-hour long interviews, saw many dozens of Sprakab analyses, read many dozens of official decisions by civil servants, had email discussions with many lawyers, and in a few appeal cases I got to read the court proceedings and decisions by judges. Although in what follows it may seem that I am biased towards or critical of the UK situation, that would not be the best interpretation. It is rather that I am simply more familiar with the UK context.

Although the details differ from country to country, the general process is the same. Refugees arrive, at airport or by land, and are interviewed cursorily by a gatekeeper (Immigration Service, or the like), followed by an interview or interviews dealing with each refugee's language and local knowledge of their area. Then an analysis (by government) or analyses (by government and myself, commissioned by a lawyer) is made of the data in the interview(s). Then a civil servant makes the decision on whether or not to admit the refugee, and in a few cases there is an appeal involving judges.<sup>26</sup>

My role has mainly been at the analysis stage, but I have also been involved in appeals. Crucial here are the interviews and the analyses: the ultimate decision by the civil servant relies heavily on the analysis/analyses provided, and the analyses depend on the interview. IND (Netherlands) and Sprakab (UK) carry out the interviews, so they are central. The least successful interviews were those by Sprakab since they were conducted by phone from Stockholm, were short, interviewers were not sympathetic or not perceived as sympathetic, unimaginative mainly yes/no questions were used, questions were given as if in a list, there was no follow up to questions, and

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<sup>26</sup> Judges, it seems, are like the rest of us – some are more open to new information than others.

limited information was given by refugees. The IND (official) interviews were better: they were face-to-face (with a translator between the faces), longer, interviewers were largely sympathetic, and better questions allowing flexibility and follow up were employed. The best were the few (unofficial Dutch) de Taalstudio interviews: the interviewee is given a list of topics and told to talk about them, either alone (monologue) or with another Bajuni (dialogue). The conversation flows along fairly well, the language used is reasonably natural, and plenty of information is given. The drawback is that there is no quality control, the refugee does not really know what is important to the analyst, so talks freely about the good old days, providing a fine language sample but not much hard local information. In those Dutch cases where both the official and the unofficial interviews were available, the latter nearly always provided more and better data for analysis.

My observations on these experiences are:

- I think language interviews and analysis are really useful in making decisions in refugee cases, but only if the interviews and the analyses are carried out by competent professionals. If carried out by incompetents, they are useless, misleading, and lead to misery for the refugee;
- Analysts and linguists<sup>27</sup> do not need to reveal their identity, for personal or security reasons, but they do need to list publicly all their sources for (a) the language situation in the target community, (b) the geographical and sociocultural situation in the target community, (c) their knowledge of linguistics (for 10 years one Sprakab employee was consistently listed as being the author of a grammar of Swahili but neither his name, the title of the book, nor any other detail has ever been revealed). I have not yet seen a single government analysis where this information was stated. Claims need to be testable against facts. Scientist do not give presentations at conferences without revealing their sources;
- Good sources are important. Most UK government judgements on Bajuni refugees are based on the 2000 report (JFFM in the References) or secondary reports partly deriving from that. But that report has many flaws (see Nurse, nd);
- Interviewers, analysts, civil servants (and judges?) should have more extensive language training. One option would be to have a general workshop, or series of workshops, to which all are invited, which would start with a general session on the use of language in

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<sup>27</sup> Sprakab reports are composed by analysts (Africans) and linguists (Europeans).

refugee cases, a second general session on language training (especially in sociolinguistics), then specific sessions on specific areas (Bajuni, Kurds, etc). Certain general but incorrect assumptions inform many decisions I have seen: for instance, the assumption that an individual of a particular country (e.g. Somalia) should speak the national language (Somali) and the language historically used in that country by the target community (Bajuni), and that if the refugee does not meet these criteria, they cannot be from that country and must be from somewhere else (e.g. Kenya, or Tanzania). Similar assumptions, mentioned earlier, are that language situations are fixed, and that it is unusual for communities to shift language or dialect. These assumptions are also incorrect;

- Interviewers and analysts need to be genuinely familiar with the situation inside the target community or country. Between 2004 and 2017 Sprakab analysts have consistently denied that Swahili is spoken in Somalia, and that the refugees do not speak Bajuni or Somali so cannot be from Somalia. These assumptions are wrong so all the Sprakab reports I have seen are incorrect. Furthermore, these analysts often list the non-linguistic claims made by refugees and then either make no comment on their veracity or dismiss them as too general, when a better statement would be that ‘I, the analyst, have no local knowledge against which to test them’;
- In the UK, the many civil servants who make the ultimate decision are scattered around the country. In Switzerland, most of the (relatively few) people involved in the whole process are in one city, Bern, in one (or two) buildings. Such a system allows for fruitful discussions and decision-making. Outcomes would improve if this was possible in the UK;
- The Dutch experience suggests it would be a good idea to have an official interview and interviewer, supplemented by a second interaction with no official interviewer but with a reasonably controlled lists of topics;
- It might be fruitful for interviewers, analysts and civil servants in the different countries to learn from each other’s experiences;
- In official interviews, certain basic parameters will lead to greater success. Thus, interviewers should be sympathetic to the interviewees, and should be so perceived. Or an interview should not simply be a list of fixed topics to be raced through as fast as possible. There should be give and take, and follow up to answers given by the interviewees. Over the thirteen years I have listened to Sprakab interviews, the technique has not changed, the

questions have not changed, the pool of interviewers has hardly changed, and so it is hardly surprising that in every case I have listed to, the conclusion ‘with certainty’ is that the refugee is from Kenya or Tanzania and not Somalia. I would suggest it is time for Sprakab and the UK Home Office to hit the Refresh button;

- Agencies should consider using DNA data. Whenever I suggest this in a report, I am often urged by the commissioning lawyer to delete it. However, it is likely that Bajunis are relatively homogenous genetically, and there are hundreds now in Europe and elsewhere. It might be time consuming and initially expensive to do such DNA testing, but it would then provide diagnostic information.

## Appendix 1: The data

The following table sets out the interview data upon which this paper is based. Column 1 ‘Year’, refers to the year of the interview. In most cases the interview year is also the year of departure from Somalia; in a few cases, departure was the previous year or a few years earlier. There are two questions about dates and demography. Widespread persecution of Bajuni started as they arrived back from Jomvu in 1998, yet these interviews start in the Netherlands only in 2004, a six-year gap. The second question concerns numbers and validity of the sample. Brian Allen interviewed more than 400 cases, I heard 177, a total of 570+. Several dozen overlapped, so we might estimate 500 cases. Section 1 above mentions a likely Somali Bajuni population of 3000-4000 in the 1990s. We do not know where the others are: they could be still in Somalia, killed, died, fled to Kenya, or gone to other countries. We cannot be absolutely sure that the 155 used here are typical of the others, but if it can be shown that the 155 behave consistently, that would be a strong argument for them being typical. Also, in our discussions, Brian Allen and I were broadly agreed on the general picture.

Column 2 refers to country of asylum: Netherlands, BELgium, IREland, UK = United Kingdom, SWeden, GERmany, NORway, SU = Switzerland. Initially there were two Canadian cases, not included in the final 155. I(ND) and S(prakab) indicate the interviewing companies. NE1 represents the first Netherlands case, NE2 the second, etc. S? means ‘probably S but not certain’.

Column 3 lists year of birth followed by age at interview. An entry such as 1982-22? means an approximate date (1982), and approximate age at interview

Column 4 shows the place of origin (occasionally the individual was born in one place, lived there a few years, then moved to the second place). RK = Ras Kiamboni, Chu= Chula, Md = Mdoa, Kis = Kismayuu, Cho = Chovai, Ko = Koyama, Fu = Fumayuu, Ch = Chandraa. An asterisk means the person spent several years in a refugee camp in Kenya or elsewhere in Kenya; 45

cases are asterisked but as not all interviews asked about such residence, there may be more such cases.

Column 5 indicates gender. Column 6 gives the number of morphological features in the individual's speech. Column 7 has the number of phonological features, in some cases followed by total number of attestations, where known. So 11: 43 means '11 Bajuni features, with 43 attestations'. The final column gives the total number of Bajuni lexical items recorded.

Year	Asylum country	Birth/age interview	Main Residence	M/F	Morphol.	Phonology	Lexicon
2004	NE1 S?	1982-22?	RK	F	1 (hu-)	8	13
2004	NE2 I	1982-22?	Chovai	F	1 (hu-)	9	4+
2005	NE3 I	1965-40	Koyama	M	none	2	none
2005	NE4 I	1981-24?	Koyama	F	none	2	1
2005	NE5 I	1981-24	RK*	F	none	11	6
2005	NE6 I	1964-41	Kismayu	M	5	16	29
2006	NE7 I	1984-22	RK	F	1 (hu-)	13	12+
2006	NE8 I	1975-31	RK	F	4	12	24
2006	NE9 I	1982-24	Chula	F	1 (hu-)	11	16
2006	NE10 I	1979-27	Chula	M	none	8	14
2006	NE11 S?	1977-29	Chovai*	M	1 (hu-)	9	13
2006	NE12 I	1971-35	RK	M	2	12	25
2006	NE13 I	1982-24	RK	F	5	17	22
2006	NE14 I	1969-37	RK?*	F	none	7	21
2006	NE15	1962-44	RK*	M	3	12	21
2006	NE16 I	1963-43	Kismayu*	M	none	3	17
2006	NE17, left 96 S	1979-17	Chula*	M	2	6	16
2006	NE18 S	1987-19	Chu/Md	F	1 (hu-)	6	16
2007	NE19 I	1979-28	Kismayu*	M	1 (-ie)	1	6
2007	NE20 S	1975-32	RK*	M	5	19	28
2007	NE21 S	1982-25	Mdoa	M	6	11	40
2007	NE22	1971-36	Kismayu	F	none	7	6
2008	BE1	young	Chula	F	2	10	15
2008	BE2	?	Koyama	M	none	4: 10	14
2008	NE23 I	1982-26	Koyama	M	5	19: 80+	20
2008	NE24 S	1982-26	Chula	M	none	8: 17	22
2008	NE25 S	1968-40	RK	M	3	21: 76	18
2008	NE26 S	1968-40	Kismayu*	M	3	16: 86	15
2008	NE27 I	1965-43	Chula	F	5	13: 40+	20+
2008	NE28 I	1982-26	Chula	M	none!	10: 26	16
2009	BE3	young?	Chula	M	1 (hu-)	6: 43	24
2009	BE4	1972-37	Kis/Cho	M	none	11: 100+	20
2009	NE29 S	1982-27	Chula	M	5	21: 92	24

2009	NE30	I	1986-23	Chula	F	3	8: 38	14
2009	NE31	I	1983-26	Kismayu*	F	none	1	2
2009	NE32	I	1978-31	Kismayu*	F	1	13: 45	20
2009	NE33	I	1990-19	Kismayu	F	2	5	12
2009	NE34	I	1984-25?	RK	M	none	2: 5	20
2009	NE35	I	1984-25	RK	F	1?	4: 7	4
2009	NE36	I	1992-17?	Cho/Chu	M	none	6	11
2009	NE37		1983-26	Chula	M	3	27: 150+	70+
2009	NE38	I	1983-26	RK*	F	1	9: 22	13
2009	NE39	I	1987-22	Kismayu	F	none	1	none
2009	NE40	I	1979-30	Chula*	M	none	8: 21	8
2009/5	IRE1	I	?	Koyama*?	M	3	12: 56	10
2009	UK1	S	?	Chula	M	none	1: 2	9
2009	UK2	S	1980-29	Chula*	M	none	none	18
2009	UK3	S	1987-22	Koyama*	F	none	2: 17	10
2009	UK4	S	1981-28?	Koyama*	M	none	4	13
2009	UK5	S	1985-24	Koyama*	F	none	2	9
2009	UK6	S	?	Chula	M	none	1	12
2009	UK7	S	1985-24	Chula	M	none	none	15
2009	UK8	S	1985-24	Chula*	F	none	none	none
2009	UK9	S	1994-15	Chula	F	none	1	10
2010	BE5		1985-25?	Chula	M	none	13	13
2010	NE41	I	1984-26	Koyama*	F	1	14: 65+	45
2010	NE42	I	1977-33	Koyama*	F	2	15: 115	36
2010	NE43	I	1989-21	Koyama	M	none	none	9
2010	NE44	I	1984-26	Kismayu	F	none	9: 21	15
2010	NE45		1978-32	Koyama	F	none	none	1
2010	NE46	S	1991-19	Chovai	M	none	7: 18	21
2010	NE47	S	1989-21	Cho, RK	M	1	11: 36	25
2010	UK10	S	1969-41	Chula	M	1	1	17
2010	UK11	S	1984-26	Chula	M	none	none	11
2010	UK12	S	1972	Koyama	F	none	none	12
2010/16	UK13	S	1988-22	Koyama*	F	none	none	7
2010	UK14	S	1970-40	Koyama*	F	none	4: 10 y	17
2010	UK15	S	1986-24	Chula	M	none	7: 28	17
2010	UK16	S	1984-26	Koyama*	M	none	3: 5	9
2010	UK17	S	1990-20	Koyama	F	1	7: 16	14
2010	UK18	S	1982-28	Chula	F	none	none	9
2010	UK19	S	1986-24	Chula*	F	1	10: 28	33
2010	UK20	S	1988-22	Chula*	M	none	2: 4	11
2010	UK21	S	1977-33	Fumayu*	M	1	none	6
2010	UK22	S	1985-25	Chula*	F	none	4: 4	11




2010	UK23	S	1990-20	RK	F	none	(2)	8
2010	UK24	S	1983-27	Koyama*	M	1	none	16
2010	UK25	S	1980-30	Chula	F	none	3: 7	12
2010	UK26	S	?	Kismayu	F	none	3: 5	5
2010	UK27	S	1998-12	Chovai	F	none	5: 10	9
2010	UK28	S	1987-13	Fuma*	F	none	none	5
2010	SW1		1986-24?	Chandraa	M	1	2: 3	6
2011	BE6		?	Chula	M	“several”	13: 60+	22
2011	BE7		?	RK	M	“several”	10: 30+	20+
2011	IRE2	S	1991-20	Chula	M	none	6: 12	9
2011	NE48	S	1991-20	Kismayu	M	(1)	13: 50+	26
2011	NE49	I	1989-22	Chula	F	none	7: 16	8
2011	NE50	S	1991-20	Chula	M	none	6: 12	11
2011	NE51	S	?	Koyama	F	1	8: 38	23
2011	NE52	S	1985-26	Chula*	M	1	14: 50+	24
2011	NE53		1986-25	Ko, Cho	M	none	4: 53	7
2011	NE54		?	Chu (RK)	F	1	8: 17	19
2011	UK29	S	1980-31	Koyama	M	2	6: 17+	20
2011	UK30	S	1984-27	Kis ?*	F	none	3: 8	14
2011	UK31	S	1983-28?	Koyama?*	M	none	2: 11	21
2011	UK32	S	1976-40?	Fumayu*	M	1	6: 11	12
2011	UK33	S	1988-23	Fumayu*	F	none	8: 17	15
2011	UK34	S	1990-21?	Koyama*	F	none	3: 8	15
2011/16	UK35	S	1980-31	Koyama	F	none	3: 8	6
2011	UK36	S	1992-19	Kis, Md*	M	none	3: 12	17
2011	UK37	S	1972-39	Koyama*	M	none	5: 13	18
2011	UK38	S	1986-25	Koyama	F	none	(2)	22
2011	UK39	S	1974-37	Koyama*	F	none	none	3
2011	UK40	S	1978-33	Koyama	M	none	2	11
2011	UK41		1994-17	Chula	F	none	2	23
2012	NE55		1990-22	Koyama*	M	none	none	none
2012	NE56		1996-16	Koyama*	F	none	1	1
2012	SW2	S	1988-24	Chovai	F	none	12: 65	20
2012	UK42	S	1995-17	Md, Chu	M	none	1	13
2012	UK43		1990-22	Chovai*	F	none	6: 30	20+
2012	UK44	S	1987-25	Mdoa	F	none	none	3
2012	UK45	S	1992-20	Koyama	F	none	3: 7	7
2012	UK46	S	1986-26	Koyama	F	1	4	18
2012	UK47	S	1992-20	Chula	M	none	1	13
2012	UK48	S	1980-32	Koyama*	F	none	6: 9	10
2013	BE8		young-?	Koyama	F	none	none	4
2013	GE1		1970-43	Chula	M	none	3: 12	17


2013	NO1	1982-31	Fumayu	M	2	18: 85	36
2013	SU1	1982-31	Koyama	F	none	1	12
2013	SW3 S	young-?	Chula	M	1	10: 40	27
2013	SW4	young-?	Chovai	M	none	7: 18	7+
2013	NE57 I	1994-19	Kismayu	F	none	none	3
2013	NE58 I	1984-29	Koyama	F	none	6: 30	12
2013	UK49 S	1987-26	Koyama	F	none	1	21
2013	UK50 S	1990-23	Chu, RK	M	none	5: 19+	12
2013	UK51 S	1984-29	Chula*	M	none	none	7
2013	UK52 S	1996-17	Chula	M	1	4: 24	24
2013	UK53 S	1962-51	RK	F	3	11: 43	25
2013	UK54 S	1983-30	Koyama	M	none	9: 12	26
2013	UK55 S	1994-19	Chula	F	none	none	13
2014	NE59	1971-43	Koyama	M	none	2: 2	none
2014	NE60	1970-44	Koyama	M	none	8: 19	none
2014	UK56 S+	1976-38	Koyama	F	none	5: 14	15
2014	UK57 S	1983-31	Mdoa	M	none	9: 26	10
2014	UK58 S	2000-14	Chovai	M	none	6:26	8
2014	UK59 S	1983-31	Chula	M	none	5: 10	18
2014	UK60 S	1990-24	Chula	F	none	8: 14	21
2015	NE61 S	1990-25	Koyama	F	none	11: 43	28
2015	NE62 S	1990-25	Koyama	M	none	1	4
2015	NE63 I	1997-18	Md, Chu?	M	none	1	1
2015	UK61 S	1980-35	Md, Chu	F	none	none	1
2015	UK62 S	1989-26	Md, Chu	M	none	3: 4	11
2015	UK63 S+	1966-49	Kismayu	M	none	3	2
2015	UK64 S	1996-19	Kismayu	F	none	none	none
2015	UK65 S	1994-21	Chula	M	none	5: 8 (?)	17
2016	NE64 I	1968-48	Chula	F	none	14: 40	22
2016	NE65 S	1989-27	Chula	M	none	9: 24	19
2016	NE66 S	1996-20	Koyama	M	none	none	11
2016	NE67 S	1994-22	Chula	F	none	none	6
2016	NE68	1991-25?	Md, Chu	M	none	6: 15	15
2016	UK66 S	1989-27	Md, Chu	M	none	2	8
2016	UK67	1976-40	Chula	M	none	6	16
2016	NE69 I	1992-25	Kismayu	M	none	2	6
2016	NE70 I	1994-23	Kismayu	F	none	5	9
2016/08	UK 68 S	1981-27	Koyama*	F	none	none	9

Average	0.64	6.00	14.28
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### Appendix 2: Map



Map: Ubajunini



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